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COMMENTS 
LABOR LAw-LMRA-"HoT CARGO" CLAUSE AS A DEFENSE TO 
SECONDARY BOYCOTT-In McAllister Transfer, Inc.1 the National 
Labor Relations Board decided to reconsider the question of "hot 
1 no N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954). 
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cargo" clauses. In this case, the Teamsters' union requested Mc-
Allister, a non-union cartage company, to recognize it as the bar-
gaining representative of McAllister's emRloyees, and submitted a 
proposed contract to the employer. When McAllister refused to 
recognize the Teamsters, the union announced that the company 
would be "shut off" from interlining freight.2 Accordingly, the 
Teamsters induced those of their members who were working for 
three other carriers not to handle McAllister freight. Each of 
these other carriers was a party to a cartage agreement with the 
Teamsters union which contained a "hot cargo" clause. Despite 
this clause, each of the other carriers posted a notice directing 
their employees to handle all freight without discrimination.8 
However, the employees were not disciplined when they refused to 
heed these notices. McAllister was effectively "shut off" from 
interlining freight until the district court issued an injunction 
under section 10 (Z) of the amended National Labor Relations 
Act.4 The trial examiner found that the union action was not a 
violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the amended NLRA,5 on the 
grounds that the "hot cargo" clause in the cartage agreement 
provided a meritorious defense. In making this decision, the trial 
examiner relied on the Conway's Express6 and the Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Company7 decisions. The National Labor Relations 
Board disagreed with the trial examiner and held that the Team-
sters had violated section 8 (b) (4) (A). In the process, the Board 
wrote three separate opinions, the total effect of which was, and 
still is, to render the status and validity of any particular "hot 
cargo" clause in some doubt. It is the purpose of this comment to 
examine the present state of the law on this subject. 
2 "Interlining" of freight means receiving freight from interstate motor carriers for 
delivery to its destination, or delivering freight to such carriers for further transportation. 
McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1772 (1954). 
8 The notice posted by Freightways (one of the secondary carriers) read as follows: 
"Our Company is not having a labor dispute with any labor union. As a common carrier 
holding authorities under Federal and State laws, we are required to transport all com-
modities properly tendered to us. 
"Therefore, we direct all of our employees to handle freight received by us, without 
discrimination as to shippers or motor carriers who may be interlining freight with us. 
This includes freight which we originate and is destined beyond our line in which specific 
routing is furnished to us by the shipper." The other tlvo secondary carriers published 
substantially similar notices. McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1773-1774 
(1954). 
4 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 149, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160. 
5 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (b) (4) (A). 
6 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), affd. Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906. 
7 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). 
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I. Secondary Boycotts and "Hot Cargo" Clauses 
The term "secondary boycott" has a long and confusing his-
tory. It was so difficult to define precisely that Congress avoided 
its use in the final draft of the Taft-Hartley Act, despite the fact 
that the committee reports and floor debates all indicate that it 
was the "secondary boycott" which section 8 (b) (4) (A) was in-
tended to control. A simple example will illustrate a typical 
secondary boycott: union U is attempting to organize company R 
(primary employer). In order to put additional economic pres-
sure on R, it goes to the employees of company A (secondary em-
ployer) and induces these employees to force A to cease doing 
business with R until it recognizes U.8 
A "hot cargo clause" is a provision in the contract between U 
and A (secondary employer) whereby A agrees that "it shall not 
be cause for discharge if any employee . . . refuse to handle un-
fair goods. . . . The term 'unfair goods' as used in this Article 
includes, but is not limited to, any goods or equipment trans-
ported, interchanged, handled or used by any carrier, whether 
party to this agreement or not, at whose terminal or terminals or 
place or places of business there is a controversy between such 
carrier or its employees on the one hand, and a labor union on the 
other hand. . . . "9 The function of these clauses is to secure 
permission from an employer to exert secondary pressure upon 
any person doing business with the employer who has, or may 
subsequently have, a dispute with the labor organization. 
II. State of the Law Prior to the McAllister Case 
A. Period Prior to the Conway Case. It is not surprising to 
find that, originally, the courts were generally quite willing to 
enjoin secondary pressure.10 Judicial opinion set up various tests 
s One of the best definitions of a secondary boycott was given by Judge Learned Hand 
in IBEW, Local 501 v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 34 at 37, where he said: "The 
gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who 
alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its 
aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce 
the employer to give in to his employees' demands." 
9 This is the language used in the cartage agreement which the trial examiner felt 
constituted a valid defense to a violation of §8 (b) (4) (A) in the McAllister case. McAllister 
Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1775 (1954). The term "unfair goods" is often used 
interchangeably with the term "hot cargo." 
10 CCH Lab. L. Rep., 4th ed., ,i239 at 701 (1955). 
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to determine the legality or illegality of such action, but the result 
of most of these tests was to limit union action severely.11 
As federal laws were enacted, the situation began to change. 
The Sherman Act12 was generally held to prohibit secondary boy-
cotts when they obstructed interstate commerce.13 The Clayton 
Act14 was held not to have changed this result15 but the Sherman 
Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,1 6 as interpreted in United 
States v. Hutcheson,17 at last made it clear that secondary action, 
as such, was no longer subject to federal injunction and was not 
unlawful under the Sherman Act. The Wagner Act,18 of course, 
did not change the law as to secondary action, but the Taft-Hartley 
Act has had a profound effect upon it. 
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that 
Congress was aiming specifically at secondary action when it 
placed section 8 (b) (4) (A) in Title I of the act. The precise 
language used by Congress is of the utmost importance, for this 
section does not proscribe only secondary action,19 nor does it 
prohibit all secondary action.20 However, the exact sweep of sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A) is beyond the scope of this comment;21 in the 
subsequent discussion it is assumed that a violation of this section 
has occurred, but for the existence of a "hot cargo" clause. 
B. The Conway Doctrine and Its Ramifications. In Con-
way's Express the Board recognized that a "hot cargo" clause could 
be a defense to a charge of violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A). Its 
reasoning was to the effect that the Taft-Hartley Act does not 
prohibit an employer from aiding a union by secondary action 
and, by the same token, it does not prevent him from contracting 
to aid, and then honoring his contract. Thus, since a "hot cargo" 
11 Id. at 701-703. 
12 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1-30. 
13 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172 (1921). 
14 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§52-53. 
15 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172 (1921). 
16 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§101-115. 
17 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941). 
1s 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §§151-168. 
19 NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' Dist. Council, (9th Cir. 1954) 211 F. 
(2d) 149. 
20 See Administrative Ruling of General Counsel, Case No. 305, 30 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1952), 
where it was held that an appeal by a union to consumers was not a secondary boycott 
within the meaning of §8 (b) (4) (A). 
21 For a concise discussion of the scope of §8 (b) (4) (A), see Torbert, "Section 8 (b) (4) (A) 
of the Taft-Hartley Law: A Study in Statutory Interpretation," 8 RUTGERS L. REv. 344 
(1954). . 
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clause was present, the Board reasoned that there was no "strike 
or concerted refusal," an element essential to a finding of a viola-
tion of section 8 (b) (4) (A).22 This decision was affirmed by the 
court of appeals.23 However, the language used by the majority 
of the court24 in discussing the question of the "hot cargo" clause 
appears to have been dictum. The contract involved was entered 
into prior to the effective date of the Taft-Hartley Act,25 and, in 
addition, the court held that "the embargo on Rabouin's goods 
was the product solely of requests addressed to management or to 
supervisory personnel. ... The union thus did not 'encourage 
the employees.' "26 A key point in both the holding of the Board27 
and the court was that the secondary employers acquiesced in the 
request of the union not to handle the goods of the primary em-
ployer. 
While it is submitted that the Conway case is not direct au-
thority for the proposition that a "hot cargo" clause constitutes a 
valid defense to a violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A), this cannot be 
said as easily of the Board's decision in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.28 
In holding that the clause was a valid defense, the Board there 
added another argument to those advanced in the Conway case. 
This argument was to the effect that the collective agreement in-
volved defined the secondary employees' "course of ... employ-
ment" and the "hot cargo" clause simply removed the handling 
of "unfair goods" from this "course of employment.''29 In addi-
tion to this new argument, the Board reiterated that "consent in 
advance to honor a hot cargo clause is not the product of the 
22 Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949). The precise holding in this case is diffi-
cult to ascertain, for there were three partial dissents. However, only Member Reynolds 
clearly dissented on the ground that a "hot cargo" clause violated the policy of the act. 
23 Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906. 
24 Judge Learned Hand dissented in this case, but on a ground that made it unnec-
essary for him to pass on the effect of the "hot cargo" clause. 
25 Section 102 of Title I of the LMRA was the controlling provision. 61 Stat. L. 152 
(1947), 29 u.s.c. (1952) §168. 
26 Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906 at 911. 
27 While the NLRB did not stress the fact that the secondary employer.; actually 
acquiesced, the majority nevertheless stated: "And each of the employers, apparently 
mindful of its contractual obligation, acquiesced in its employees' refusal to handle the 
'hot' cargo." Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 at 981 (1949). 
28 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). Even in this case the Board pointed out (at 743-744) that 
"with but one belated exception, the employers herein affirmed the contracts by acqui-
escing in their enforcement during the period of the Respondent's refusal to handle 
Pittsburgh's unfair goods." 
29 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 at 744 (1953). 
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union's forcing or requiring any employer ... to cease doing 
business with any other person."30 
The impetus that these two decisions gave to the "hot cargo" 
clauses became manifest both in the redrafting of clauses by un-
ions31 and by denials of section 10 (Z) injunctions in cases in which 
they were involved.32 
III. Effect of the McAllister Decision 
As could be imagined, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction 
among employers with the Conway doctrine. The arguments 
against it are variously phrased, but the central theme is that "hot 
cargo" clauses are merely contractual secondary boycotts and vio-
late the policy of section 8 (b) (4) (A). Put in more colorful lan-
guage, it was said that "the 'hot cargo'. arrangement is nothing 
more than the old secondary boycott clothed in a new raiment of 
would-be-respectability. But the sheep's clothing should not con-
ceal the wolf from the eyes of the law."33 It was in this setting that 
the Board reconsidered the Conway <;l.octrine in the McAllister 
case. 
A. Opinion of Members Rodgers and Beeson. These mem-
bers felt that Congress declared a public policy against all second-
ary boycotts, without distinction as to type or kind.34 They stressed 
30 Id. at 744. 
31 The cartage agreement to which the secondary employers in the McAllister case 
were parties stated: "There shall be a· record understanding that, in the event the decision 
of the National Labor Relations Board in the Conway case ... is sustained or prevails on 
appeal to the higher Federal Courts, this Article will be renegotiated and rewritten to 
provide the Union with the maximum of protection afforded by such decision." ll0 
N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1775 (1954). As a result of this clause, the agreement was modified. 
This modification was not effective until after the §10 (l) injunction had been issued by 
the district court and thus had no effect on the decision in this case. ll0 N.L.R.B. 1769 
at 1775 (1954). 
32 Madden v. Local 442, IBT-AFL, (D.C. Wis. 1953) ll4 F. Supp. 932. Contra, Hum-
phrey v. Local 294, IBT-AFL, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 25 L.R.R.M. 2318. 
33 Lloyd and Wessel, "Public Policy and Secondary Boycotts,'' 23 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 
31 at 53 (1954). 
34 They quoted Senator Taft's statements in the course of legislative debate, where 
he said: "The Senator will find a great many decisions . . . which hold that under the 
common law a secondary boycott is unlawful. Subsequently, under the provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind 
of a strike, no matter how unlawful it may have been at common law. All this provision 
[§8 (b) (4) (A)] of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts. 
It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad ~econdary boycotts. 
Our committee heard: evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us 
any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the 
provisions dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice." 
93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947). 
1955] COMMENTS 259 
the fact that the pre-enactment material on section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) 
emphasizes the aim of the protection of the public welfare and not 
merely the vindication of private rights.35 They relied on section 
10 (a) of the amended NLRA as meaning that private contracts 
do not prevent the Board from acting in the public interest.36 
They stated that "Congress deliberately banned the inducement 
or encouragement in Section 8 (b) (4) (A) outright ... and did 
not say that this is proscribed unless there is a contract provision 
permitting it to occur .... "37 They felt that Congress was well 
aware of the uniform rule of the Board and the courts that con-
tracts in violation of the policy of the act were void, and thus there 
was no need to provide so specifically. Finally, they disagreed 
completely with the "course of ... employment" argument 
presented in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case.38 They argued 
that these words have a technical and well established meaning in 
the law (particularly in cases interpreting workmen's compensa-
tion laws39) and that they were used here merely to point up the 
fact that a distinction is to be drawn under section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) be-
tween employees in their capacity as employees, and employees in 
35 For example, the Senate Report stated that: "Because of the nature of certain of 
these practices, especially ..• secondary boycotts ••• the committee is convinced that 
additional procedures must be made available under the National Labor Relations Act 
in order adequately to protect the public welfare which is inextricably involved in labor 
disputes . ..• Hence, we have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and 
not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief ••.• " S. Rep. 105, 
80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1947). Italics added by the Board. 
36 Section 10 (a) states that "the Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person 
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce, This 
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been 
or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise ..•• " 61 Stat. L. 146 (1947), 29 
U.S.C. (1952) §160. Italics added. This has been interpreted to mean that private con-
tracts do not affect the Board's power. See generally, Amalgamated Utility Workers (CIO) 
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct. 561 (1940); National Licorice Co. v. 
NLRB, 309 U.S. 250, 60 S.Ct. 569 (1940); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct. 
576 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 64 S.Ct. 830 (1944); NLRB 
v. General Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 306. 
37 McAllister Transfer, Inc., HO N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1780 (1954). 
38 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). 
89 6 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT, perm. ed., 19-20 (1948) defines this 
phrase as follows: "In the course of employment points to the time, place, and circum-
stances under which an accident takes place, and simply means 'while the employment 
was in progress.' " For an example of the broad sweep given this language by the Supreme 
Court, see Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 288 U.S. 162, 53 S.Ct. 380, 87 
A.L.R. 245 (1933). From these definitions it seems that the employees of the secondary 
carriers would have been "in the course of employment" if they had been injured han-
dling McAllister freight (some of these employees did handle one shipment of McAllister 
freight-clothing and medicine for a chi~dren's home) and there is 1?-o apparent r~ason_ to 
give these words a different meaning m §8 (b) (4) (A). For the view of the dissenting 
members on this point, see note 52 infra. 
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their capacity as private consumers_. In conclusion, they recom-
mended overruling the Conway and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 
decisions to the extent they were inconsistent with their views.40 
It may be contended that the ·Rodgers-Beeson analysis proves 
too much, for Congress did not in fact proscribe all secondary 
boycotts.41 But the answer is that the type of secondary activity 
underlying the "hot cargo" situation is the critical point and that 
this is a type which Congress did intend to prohibit, iqespective 
of the presence of a "hot cargo" clause. This position has con-
siderable support in the pre-enactment material. Thus, the 
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, in explaining the 
kind of activity at which section 8 (b) (4) (A) was particularly di-
rected, stated: 
"This paragraph also makes it an unfair labor practice for 
a union to engage in the type of secondary boycott that has 
been conducted in New York City by Local No. 3 of !BEW, 
whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products 
of manufacturers employing electricians who are members of 
some labor organization other than Local No. 3 (See testi-
mony of R. S. Edwards, vol. I, P. 176 et seq.; Allen Bradley 
Co. v. Local No. 3, !BEW, 325 U.S. 797)."42 
It is significant that the kind of activity in which Local No. 3 had 
engaged was a product boycott, sanctioned by a type of "hot cargo" 
clause. There was also a great deal of material presented at the 
hearings on secondary boycotts in the trucking industry,43 and this 
clearly influenced some members of Congress. Senator Ball, in 
offering an amendment to the Senate bill which would have given 
private parties, as well as the General Counsel, authority to apply 
directly to federal district courts for injunctions in secondary boy-
cott cases, 44 stated: 
40 This position is basically the same as that taken by Member Reynolds in Conway's 
Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 at 988 (1949). It has been accepted by only one court prior to 
the McAllister decision. See Humphrey v. Local 294, IBT-AFL, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 25 
L.R.R.M. 2318 (1954). 
41 See 48 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 735 at 739-740 (1954). 
42 S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 22 (1947). 
43 See testimony of M. J. Mulvihill, H. Hearings before the Committee on Education 
and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 256-347 (1947); testimony of H. L. Strobel, id. at 702-
742; testimony of P. C. Turner, id. at 1840-1859. 
44 This amendment was not passed, but much of its language was incorporated into 
a substitute amendment, §303, which gives private parties a damage remedy for the same 
action proscribed in §8 (b) (4). 61 Stat. L. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §187. 
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"the secondary boycott is one of the most vicious abuses of 
economic power now being indulged in by labor unions. It 
is being used . . . virtually to dictate the terms on which 
small businessmen, farmers, and other persons may do busi-
ness with each other. In the Philadelphia, Baltimore, and 
New York markets, the farmers hauling their produce are 
compelled to obey 100 percent every rule laid down by the 
teamsters' union, or they cannot do business .... "45 
These and other statements in the pre-enactment material hardly 
support the view that Congress intended to exempt contractual 
secondary boycotts from the sweep of section 8 (b) (4) (A). 
B. Concurring Opinion of Chairman Farmer. Chairman 
Farmer agreed that the Teamsters had engaged in secondary activ-
ity in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A), despite the "hot cargo" 
clause, but he distinguished this case from Conway46 in that here~ 
unlike Conway~ the employees acted contrary to explicit instruc-
tions from their employer. He felt that the refusal to follow the 
notices published by the secondary carriers was a type of "refusal" 
covered by section 8 (b) (4) (.~). 
It is submitted that this analysis is sound. It is supported by 
the language of the statute as well as by the available evidence of 
congressional intent. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) makes it an unfair labor 
practice for a union " . . . to induce or encourage the employees 
of any employer to engage in . . . a concerted refusal . . . to 
transport . . . where an object is: (A) forcing or requiring any 
employer . . . to cease . . . handling, transporting, . . . or to 
cease doing business with any other person." The "hot cargo'" 
clause goes primarily-to the element of "refusal" and the chairman 
rightly held that there can be a refusal whether or not there is ai. 
"hot cargo" clause.47 It is true that this non-acquiescence by the 
employer might be a violation of the collective agreement but this 
does not change the character of the empl?yees' conduct. 
45 93 CONG. REC. 4836 (1947). 
46 The chairman limited his opinion to the factual distinctions between the two cases. 
He stated: "However, I do not find it necessary, or even appropriate, to overrule the 
Board's Conway decision; nor would I go so far as to characterize the 'hot cargo' provi-
sion ... as being contrary to public policy." McAllister Transfer, Inc., IIO N.L.R.B. 1769 
at 1788 (1954). Cf. Sand Door & Plywood Co., ll3 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 
(1955). 
47 This is not only in accord with the common meaning of the word "refusal" but it is 
precisely the word used in the "hot cargo" clause here in question. See note 9 supra and 
adjacent text. 
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This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that a "hot 
cargo" clause exists at the will of the employer.48 This is so be-
cause it seems clear that a union could not lawfully strike to get a 
"hot cargo" clause.49 If a union could do so, the legality of a 
secondary boycott would turn on whether the union properly 
planned its strike or organizing campaign. For example, if union 
U wished to organize employer R and felt that it would need to 
put some secondary economic pressure on him, it could first strike 
employer A (a principal customer or supplier of R) for a "hot 
cargo" clause, then strike R and rely on the clause as a defense to 
any proceeding against it resulting from the secondary pressure 
on A.50 , 
C. Dissenting Opinion of Members Murdock and Peterson. 
Members Murdock and Peterson would have sustained the trial 
examiner's intermediate report. They felt that the legislative 
history of the LMRA did not justify the conclusion that "hot 
cargo" clauses ~e against public policy. In their view, the public 
interest discussed by Members Rodgers and Beeson is a policy of 
protecting neutral, secondary employers who become involved 
involuntarily in a labor dispute when they do not have any real 
conflict with their employees,51 and employers can waive this 
statutory protection by entering into contracts containing "hot 
cargo" clauses. Members Murdock and Peterson also disagreed 
with Chairman Farmer's analysis. They felt that non-acquiescence 
by the secondary employers had not been proved merely by show-
48 There is clearly no provision in the act which prevents· an employer from dealing 
or not dealing with any otlier employer. This is not quite the situation when a common 
carrier, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act or similar state law, is involved. See 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., (D.C. Ore. 1953, 1954) 128 F. 
Supp. 475, 520. 
49 While this seems to come within the proscription of §8 (b) (4)(A), there is no clear 
decision on the point. In fact the NLRB in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 
at 744, n. 6 (1953), specifically refused to pass on this question. 
50 The clear language of §8 (b) (4) (A) would seem to prevent a union from striking to 
enforce a "hot cargo" clause. This section makes it an unfair labor practice for a union 
" ..• (4) to engage in .•. a strike ... where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring 
any employer ..• to cease doing business with any other person .•.. " Despite this seem-
ingly clear language, it is on this point that the Teamsters may seek to avoid the impact 
of the McAllister decision. It is submitted that this attempt will succeed only in those 
cases where the general counsel is unable to prove that "an object" of the strike was the 
secondary boycott. For an example of this attempt see, "New 'Hot Cargo' Clause Nego-
tiated by Teamsters," 35 LAB. REL. REP. 259 (1955). 
51 To support this position the dissent quotes several committee reports and statements 
made in the course of legislative debate which clearly show that the protection of neutral 
employers was :lt least one of the objects behind §8 (b) (4) (A). See McAllister Transfer, 
Inc., llO N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1792 (1954). 
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ing the posting of notices ordering their employees not to dis-
criminate, but that even if it had, the contractual obligation of 
the employer should be binding on him. 
These arguments were simply a restatement of the reasoning 
used in the Conway opinion.6 !) This reasoning, as Members 
Rodgers and Beeson pointed out, emphasizes only one of the evils 
of secondary action.53 It is the difference in the interpretation of 
the public policy basis of the act that leads to the divergence of 
views concerning the application of the waiver-of-protection doc-
trine, as exemplified by the "hot cargo" clause. Thus if section 
8 (b) (4) (A) was intended only for the protection of the secondary 
employer, he might be able to waive it. However, this argument 
fails if the general public welfare is also considered.54 Since the 
pre-enactment material indicates that Congress was concerned with 
the effect on the general public as well as the effect on the second-
ary employer, it can certainly be argued that the waiver-of-protec-
tion doctrine is inapplicable when applied to section 8 (b) (4) (A). 
The dissenters' attempt to refute the analysis of Chairman 
Farmer is not convincing. They based their repudiation of his 
position on the assertion that the secondary employers really 
did acquiesce in the employees' conduct and thus there was no 
"refusal" by them. This argument ignores the realities of the 
situation. A secondary employer might vehemently object to 
putting pressure on a customer or supplier but he might not (from 
a purely practical standpoint) be willing to discharge or discipline 
recalcitrant employees for fear of getting himself involved in a 
52 It is significant to note that the dissent does not place any real reliance on the 
"course of ... employment" argument made in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case. They 
state, " ... while we do not say that the interpretation which Members Rodgers and 
Beeson would give to the phrase is lacking in merit, we cannot agree that their construc-
tion is any more an expression of Congressional intent than was the Board's interpreta_tion 
in the Pittsburgh case." McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1797 (1954). 
Chairman Farmer and Member Leedom have adopted Member Rodgers' views on this 
point. See Sand Door & Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 at 1481 
(1955). 
63 The very purpose of the LMRA, as stated in §1 (b), is "to define and proscribe 
practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical 
to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor 
disputes affecting coipmerce." 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §141 (b). It would 
seem that a secondary boycott in the transportation industry is one place where the "rights 
of the public" are dearly involved, for these boycotts invariably keep the goods of many 
shippers "tied up" when they would otherwise be promptly delivered. 
54 See 12 AM. JUR., Contracts §166 (1938). 
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strike.55 This is surely not acquiesence in any true sense of the 
word.56 Thus, while the dissent presented a plausible answer to 
the opinion of Members Rodgers and Beeson,57 it did not satisfac-
torily answer Chairman Farmer.58 
IV. The Law After the McAllister Gase 
It is submitted that the opinioh express~d by Chairman Farmer 
in the McAllister case, that "hot cargo" clauses are not invalid per 
se but that they can furnish a valid defense to an action under sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A) only if they are acquiesced in by the employer, is 
the most plausible application of the law. However, as this case 
was handed down on the last day Member Beeson sat on the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board,59 there was considerable specula-
tion as to just what position Member Leedom60 would assume.61 
This question was answered in Sand Door & Plywood Go.62 In 
this case Member Leedom joined with Chairman Farmer in the 
majority opinion.63 Despite the fact that there was no notice 
55 It is true that this strike might be a violation of §8 (b) (4) (A), but the employer 
might not feel that his legal rights were worth getting involved in a lawsuit when, for 
example, such involvement might do him considerable harm from a public relations 
standpoint. 
56 The word "acquiescence" carries no connotation of avowed consent or of opposition. 
It is defined as "a silent appearance of consent .... Failure to make _any objections." 1 
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 114. 
57 The dissent showed that the pre-enactment material does not conclusively indicate 
a congressional intent to outlaw "hot cargo" clauses. 
58 The dissenters would have disagreed with Chairman Farmer's opinion even if they 
had felt that non-acquiescence had been proved. They stated that they were not convinced 
that the Board should countenance such a repudiation of a collective agreement when 
the result would be that the other party would be guilty of an unfair labor practice. 
McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1791 (1954). 
59 The position of the Board members remained substantially unchanged in a similar 
case decided on the same day as the McAllister case. See Reilly Cartage Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 
1742 (1954). 
60 Member Leedom was appointed to the National Labor Relations Board for a five 
year term effective December 17, 1954, the day after the McAllister decision was handed 
down. 
61 Meanwhile the district courts properly assumed that Chairman Farmer's opinion 
represented the present shape of the law. See Douds v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees 
Local No. 680, IBT-AFL, (D.C. N.J. 1955) 36 L.R.R.M. 2410. Cf. Graham v. International 
Woodworkers of America, Local 7-140, CIO, (D.C. Ore. 1955) 36 L.R.R.M. 2243. 
62113 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1955). In simplified form the facts are as 
follows: U had a contract containing a "hot cargo" clause with Company X. U found out 
that X was installing some nonunion doors manufactured by Company Y and supplied 
by Sand Door. U then told Z, a foreman who was also a union member in charge of 
enforcing union rules relating to the use of nonunion goods, the status of the doors. He 
in turn passed the word around and no more of these doors were installed. 
63 The position of Members Rodgers, Peterson and Murdock remained substantially 
unchanged in this case. 
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posted by the employer to indicate his non-acquiescence, the new 
majority was apparently willing to say that the "hot cargo" clause 
did not even give the union the right to go direc#y to the em-
ployees and tell them of their "rights" under the contract. 64 This 
could be read as completely nullifying all "hot cargo" clauses, but 
there are indications in the opinion that the majority was not pre-
pared to go this far. They expressly refused to hold these clauses 
void as against the policy of the act and they also stated that "this 
is essentially the view expressed by Chairman Farmer in his con-
curring opinion in the McAllister case ... .''65 There is still 
some life left in the non-acquiescence theory of Chairman Farmer. 
It is true that this non-acquiescence may not require an express 
employer repudiation, but some expression of disapproval, e.g., a 
standing rule not to discriminate in receiving or shipping freight, 
may still be necessary. 
It is important to note that the decision in Sand Door & Ply-
wood Co. was handed down one day before the term of office of 
Chairman Farmer expired. Thus the Board is evenly divided on 
the question as of this ·writing. If the next member agrees with 
either Member Rodgers or with Member Leedom, the Board's 
position will not change. However, if he should agree with Mem-
bers Murdock and Peterson, the Conway doctrine will become re-
established. Another event which might change the present shape 
of the law would be an appeal. It seems certain that one of the 
current cases in this area will be taken to a court of appeals for en-
forcement, for the subject is one of vital concern to many of the 
nation's largest labor organizations66 and employer associations.67 
The importance of the problem clearly points to the desirability 
of congressional clarification. However, in view of the political 
difficulties attending any attempt to amend the Taft-Hartley Act, 
it seems likely that labor and management will have to live with 
the Board and court dispositions of "hot cargo" clauses. 
Jack G. Armstrong, S.Ed. 
64 Sand Door &: Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 at 1481 (1955). 
65 Id. at 1481, n. 20. 
66 The CIO has rarely found it advisable to use "hot cargo" clauses. These clauses 
are found in practically all Teamster contracts, however, and in a great many of the con-
tracts negotiated by unions in the construction and printing industries. 
67 The employer associations in the trucking business have a particularly vital concern 
in this area, as they see themselves being put into an impossible situation. For example, 
if they agree to a "hot cargo" clause and acquiesce in its operation, they are subject to 
damages for violation of their responsibilities as a common carrier under the doctrine of 
Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., (D.C. Ore. 1953, 1954) 128 F. 
